Preventing account takeover

on centralized cryptocurrency exchanges

Tagged: Software Security

This blog post highlights key points from our new white paper Preventing Account Takeovers on Centralized Cryptocurrency Exchanges, which documents ATO-related attack vectors and defenses tailored to CEXes.

Imagine trying to log in to your centralized cryptocurrency exchange (CEX) account and your password and username just… don’t work. You try them again. Same problem. Your heart rate increases a little bit at this point, especially since you are using a password manager. Maybe a service outage is all that’s responsible (knock on wood), and your password will work again as soon as it’s fixed? But it is becoming increasingly likely that you’re the victim of an account takeover (ATO).

CEXes’ choices dictate how (or if) the people who use them can secure their funds. Since account security features vary between platforms and are not always documented, the user might not know what to expect nor how to configure their account best for their personal threat model. Design choices like not supporting phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) methods like U2F hardware security keys, or not tracking user events in order to push in-app “was this you?” account lockdown prompts when anomalies happen invite the attacker in.

Our white paper’s goal is to inform and enable CEXes to provide a secure-by-design platform for their users. Executives can get a high-level overview of the vulnerabilities and entities involved in user account takeover. We recommend a set of overlapping security controls that they can bring to team leads and technical product managers to check for and prioritize if not yet implemented. Security engineers and software engineers can also use our work as a reference for the risks of not integrating, maintaining, and documenting appropriate ATO mitigations.

This is an excerpt from the Trail of Bits blog. You can read the full post here.
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